My research examines how geoeconomic rivalry reshapes regional organizations, and how those institutions change when outside powers compete for influence. I combine original data collection with survey research and case evidence, drawing on Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
My central claim is that geoeconomic rivalry does not translate directly into institutional change. It works through a political process in which coalitions of member states contest the direction of their regional organizations: external pressure is the shock, but the outcome depends on how it aligns with the distribution of national preferences within a region and on the institutional legacies through which coalitional conflict is filtered.
The project develops an account of where those national preferences come from — economic structure sets the feasible range of a government's external alignment, and governing ideology selects within it. Anchored in Latin America, whose dense ecology of overlapping organizations makes institutional change observable, the dissertation comprises three articles: one on why organizations align, hedge, or diversify under a common external shock; one on when building a parallel organization hollows out an incumbent rather than proliferating alongside it; and one on why organizations that endorse democratic norms enforce them so selectively.
Committee: Sarah Kreps and Kenneth Roberts (co-chairs), Christopher Way, Richard Clark
"Bias or Bandwidth? Mission Timing and Recommendation Politics in OAS Monitoring." Presented at APSA 2026 and the LACS Graduate Research Symposium.
"Fighting Fire with Finance: How Donors Compete in Regional Development Banks." With Kathleen M. Bahian Fallon.Presented at APSA 2026 and GIPES, Columbia University.
"Regional Unity or Discord? Exploring Incentives for Regional Organization Intervention in Civil Conflicts."
As a 2026 Kohut Research Scholar at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, I study how citizens in Latin America respond to competing external influences and domestic crises, and when those conditions generate support for regional cooperation, greater autonomy from outside powers, or alternative patterns of alignment.